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'The political' represents a moment in which actors recognise autonomy and 
equality as constitutive values in the agonistic search for appropriate open-ended 
political outcomes. In today's power struggles, the tutelary, pedagogical and 
disciplinary practices of the depoliticised European Union (EU) undermine the 
foundations of equality in diplomatic and political engagement between 
continental actors. The relationship tends to become axiological, where issues are 
deemed to have been resolved through some sort of anterior pre-political 
arrangement. Solutions to the historical problems of one era and situation are 
transferred as complete and finished answers to the challenges of other times and 
spaces. This is a type of ahistorical political monism that ultimately claims to 
speak for all of Europe. 7KHUHWXUQRIµWKHSROLWLFDO¶ZRXOGDOORZDPRUHJHQHURXV
and pluralistic politics to emerge based on genuine dialogical foundations in 
which self and other engage as equals and are mutually transformed by that 
engagement. 
 




The European post-Cold War order has assumed monist forms.1 Instead of the geopolitical and 
ideological diversity sought by Mikhail Gorbachev as he brought the Cold War to an end in the 
late 1980s, a type of monist cold peace was imposed in which Atlanticist institutions and ideas 
were advanced as the only appropriate ones. Even traditional Gaullist Euro-Atlantic aspirations 
ZHUH PDUJLQDOLVHG DQG HYHQ PRUH VR *RUEDFKHYLDQ DVSLUDWLRQV IRU D µ&RPPRQ (XURSHDQ
+RPH¶WRGD\NQRZQDVWKHJUHDWHU(XURSHSURMHFWThis monological response by definition 
excluded Russia as anything but subaltern in the post-communist European peace order. An 
axiological style of politics predominated where negotiation reduced to discussion of the terms 
of adaptation rather than an open-ended dialogical relationship of mutual engagement and 
transformation. The European Union (EU) from the outset had a monist potential, which in the 
post-Cold War era became an actuality. The bureaucratic political character of the EU 
distanced politics from the demos, undermining popular sovereignty (Heartfield 2013). While 
societies and states in the EU are intensely plural, there has been a monist, non-political, 
FKDUDFWHUWRWKH(8¶VGHYHORSPHQW7KLVLVDPSOLILHGZKHQLWFRPHVWRH[WHUQDOUHODWLRQV7KH
EU has been monist externally in the sense that it projects a certain vision of the world and 
represents a certain type of European order. This is the substance of the debate about the EU 
as a normative power. For Europe, the past was the other, the struggle to repudiate and 
transcend the cycle of inter-state conflicts that culminated in two devastating world wars in less 
                                                     
1
 This article was originally FRQFHLYHGDVSDUWRIDSURMHFWRQµ7KH3ROLWLFVDQG³7KH3ROLWLFDO´RIWKH
Eastern Partnership Initiative: Re-VKDSLQJWKH$JHQGD¶GLUHFWHGE\(OHQD.RURVWHOHYD,ZRXOGOLNHWR
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than half a century (Wæver 1996). The result, paradoxically, was incoherence in dealing with 
WKHDFWXDOVSDWLDORWKHUVRQWKH(8¶VERUGHUVWRWKHHDVW+DYLQJachieved a certain resolution 
of its own temporal challenges, the EU proved unable to devise equally effective solutions to 
the spatial challenges on its periphery. 
7KHUHVSRQVHZDVWRWUDQVIRUPWKHFRQWLQHQWLQWKH(8¶VLPDJH7KH(8UHSUHVHQWVD
type of µVPDOOHU(XURSH¶D FRUH LQZKLFKFHUWDLQSUREOHPVRIKLVWRU\KDYH putatively been 
UHVROYHG7KHµZLGHU(XURSH¶SURMHFWVHHNVWRDSSO\WKLVUHVROXWLRQWRD µIURQWOLQH¶area with a 
very different history, contested identities and specific regional challenges. The temporal 
linearity of the transitological approach assumed a spatial character, characterised by 
FRQGLWLRQDOLW\µH[WHUQDOJRYHUQDQFH¶, DQGµGRZQORDGLQJ¶7KHLQWHUVHFWLRQRIWLPHDQGVSDFH
had potentially devastating consequences. Through the practLFHV RI µ(XURSHDQLVDWLRQ¶ the 
region was to be transformed through enlargement and neighbourhood policies. The result in 
the case of Ukraine was the catastrophic breakdown of the post-Cold War European security 
order (Sakwa 2016). This provoked what some cDOODQHZµ&ROG:DU¶Cohen 2017, Legvold 
2016), whose causes remain contested. One argument is that the original Cold War never 
ended, since the institutions and ideological framework in which it was instantiated on the 
western side continued to exist and flourish. From this perspective, Europe never really 
PDQDJHGWRFUDZORXWIURPWKH&ROG:DURYHUOD\DQGWKHQRWLRQRID(XURSHµZKROHDQGIUHH¶
became just another axiological slogan of the Atlantic hegemony. Another view suggests that 
the new confrontation LQ(XURSHLVVRGLIIHUHQWWKDWWKHDSSURSULDWLRQRIWKHFRQFHSWRIµ&ROG
:DU¶ UHSUHVHQWV DQ DEXVH RI KLVWRU\ DQG D PLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH G\QDPLFV RI UHQHZHG
contestation (Monaghan 2015). There are many more contrasting interpretive frameworks, but 
what is uncontested is that we are now faced with contending axiologies (deep-rooted 
ontologies of social reality), each of which is relatively hermetic. Interactions between these 
axiological systems operate at the normative, identarian and geopolitical levels and assume 
depoliticised forms.  
,QGHIHQFHRIWKHSUHURJDWLYHVDQGSULPDF\RIWKHµVPDOOHU(XURSH¶WKHEU failed to 
substantiate a transformed European community in which valance was given to the political 
subjectivity of the other. For understandable reasons, the EU feared exposing itself to 
relationships that were not one-directional but open to dialogical engagement in which both 
sides were susceptible to transformation by the act of engagement itself. This would politicise 
the relationships, and allow a shift beyond a monism based on the idea that political problems 
KDYH DOUHDG\ EHHQ UHVROYHG DQG DOO WKDW UHPDLQV LV WR WUDQVIHU WKHVH VROXWLRQV WR WKH (8¶V
environs. Instead, in its Eastern neighbourhood, the EU practiced a politics of enlargement 
without accession, driven by the agenda of norm and policy diffusion. The incentive structure 
for the recipients was by no means geared so favourably to the EU as it was in most of the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the enlargements of the 2000s (Edkins (ed.) 1999). 
A technocratic politics-as-usual oriented approach generated contradictions that ultimately can 
only be resolved by the return of the political as an act of agonistic negotiation between 
ontological equals (Mouffe 1993). Following the shock of the Ukraine crisis there is an 
increased awareness in the EU that the classic enlargement model has reached its limits and 
that a new approach is required. The response, however, has been more about a change in tone 
rather than in the substantive methods, and the old hierarchies have been maintained. Relations 
with others are still centred on reproducing the norms of the pre-established order through 
bureaucratised politics. The appropriate framework for the return of the political in WKH(8¶V
engagement with its neighbourhood remains unclear, but the unfinished agenda of 1989 
remains on the table ± the radical transformation of European political space.  
We do not need to look far to find the normative framework for a more political Europe. 
7KHSOXUDOLVW µJUHDWHU (XURSH¶ DGYRFDWHGE\5XVVLD DQG VRPHRWKHU FRXQWULHV UHSUHVHQWV DQ
DOWHUQDWLYHLGHDWLRQDODQGQRUPDWLYHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIµ(XURSH¶DVZHOOas providing a more 
3 
 
µGLDORJLFDO¶DOWHUQDWLYHVSDWLDO µDUFKLWHFWXUH¶ IRU WKHFRQWLQHQW The advocacy of geopolitical 
and ideational pluralism at the European level means the return of the common search for the 
solution to historical problems of continental development. The return of history also means 
the return of the political. The smaller Europe represented by the EU in this framework 
becomes MXVW RQH DFWRU DPRQJ PDQ\ ZKLOH LWV µZLGHU (XURSH¶ DJHQGD LV VXEVXPHG LQWR D
broader debate over how to create a pan-(XURSHDQSROLWLFDOFRPPXQLW\,QVWHDGRIWKHµFODVK
RILQWHJUDWLRQV¶DQGµFRPSHWLQJQHLJKERXUKRRGV¶WKHSULRULW\EHFRPHVWKHVWUXJJOHWRVKDSHD
European commonwealth. This is far from a return to the politics of Yalta, where the fate of 
the continent was decided by sovereign great powers. This is not only unacceptable to the 
smaller states, EXWWKHYHU\LGHDRIµVSKHUHVRILQIOXHQFH¶LVQRUPDWLYHO\KRVWLOHWRDJHQXLQHO\
plural Europe. The substantive model of greater Europe represents precisely a framework 
where all the states and societies can express political diversity within a common framework 
of pan-European institutions (for a critique, see Zwolski 2016).  
Instead, European monism as expressed in the smaller and wider Europes is a model of 
development unable to engage with difference on the basis of equality. In other words, 
EXURSHDQPRQLVPLVWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOH[SUHVVLRQRILQFRUSRUDWHGµSROLWLFV¶ where history has 
ended. Bureaucratic processes substantiate a Heideggerian techné, a specific technocratic 
approach to the management of public and international affairs. The classic Monnet-method 
was designed to depoliticise the integration process, but the neo-functionalist primacy of 
economics and politics over society and culture had devastating long-term consequences (Pabst 
2016, 196). The technocratic imperative was at its most devastating after 1989. The EU was 
challenged to forge isomorphic political relations with neighbouring countries that could not 
be disciplined through the accession process. Instead of open-ended dialogue and pluralistic 
HQJDJHPHQW EHWZHHQ HTXDO VRYHUHLJQWLHV FKDUDFWHULVWLF RI µWKH SROLWLFDO¶, the depoliticised 
policy of tutelary enlargement of the Atlantic system was practiced. 
This article will move in five steps. The next section outlines the multiplicity of existing 
Europes, and analyses the stresses imposed on the plural reality by monist practices. This is 
followed by some theoretical discussion which seeks to deepen understanding of the 
contradictions of contemporary European spatial and normative order. The third section 
explores the historical roots of contemporary European monism, followed by discussion of 




Many Europes and none 
 
Three models of European spatial order are in contestation, each representing a certain type of 
politics. The smaller Europe represented by the EU asserts expansive normative and spatial 
claims, yet it is by definition partial and lacks an isomorphic continental agenda. It is naïve to 
DVVXPHWKDW WKH(8¶V$WODQWLFLVWDQFKRUKDVQRW LQIOXHQFHG WKH IRUPXODWion of policy to the 
post-communist East (pace Haukkala 2016). The normative framework has been the subject of 
extensive discussion, but has tended to establish the ideational framework for the parallel 
debate over the spatial dimension. The problem has been that these two debates have been 
conducted in parallel; when they come together, there are some disturbing theoretical 
consequences. The normative discussion describes the quality and character of the type of 
politics represented by the EU. When this is applied to spatial interaction, it provokes a 
hermetic discourse that assumes certain fundamental problems of interaction have been 
resolved. This shapes the debate over the second Europe, the one which is the object of the EU 
µZLGHU(XURSH¶ VWUDWHJ\7KLs is a zone of contestation, but the character of the struggle is 
peculiarly depoliticised. While there are extensive discussions of a technical character, the 
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fundamental political issues are reduced to bureaucratic resolution. The mismatch between the 
teFKQRFUDWLFSUDFWLFHVRI(8GHSROLWLFLVHGJRYHUQPHQWDOLW\DQGWKHUHJLRQ¶VKHDYLO\SROLWLFLVHG
struggles over identity generates a fracture zone reproducing the axiological and Gnostic 
politics of the Cold War era.  
The third Europe is the one championed b\5XVVLDQDPHO\WKHµJUHDWHU(XURSH¶LGHDl 
of a continental union of some sort stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Greater Europe, of 
course, is not a proprietary Russian idea, but has deep roots in European political philosophy. 
In the contemporary period, greater Europe is DVVRFLDWHGLQSDUWLFXODUZLWK&KDUOHVGH*DXOOH¶V
idea, advanced in Strasbourg on 23 November 1959, for a Europe from the Atlantic to the 
8UDOVDFFRPSDQLHGE\ZKDWKHODWHUFDOOHGDµ(XURSHGHVPDWULHV¶. In current parlance, this 
repudiates any moves towards a United States of Europe in favour of a Union of the States of 
Europe. This was the idea advanced by Gorbachev. Addressing the Council of Europe in 
Strasbourg on 6 July 1989, Gorbachev outlined his LGHDIRUDµ&RPPRQ(XURSHDQ+RPH¶DQG
his vision for post±Cold War Europe. Gorbachev argued eloquently and forcefully that 
GLIIHUHQWV\VWHPVFRXOGFRH[LVWSHDFHIXOO\1RZFRPPRQO\GHVFULEHGDVµJUHDWHU(XURSH¶WKLV
is a programme for geopolitical and normative pluralism. The idea was taken up by Vladimir 
Putin from the mid-2000s, having failed to find a formula for Russia to become part of an 
extended Euro-$WODQWLFRU(8FRPPXQLW\7KHREYLRXVSDUDGR[LVWKDW5XVVLD¶VDGYRFDF\RI
a pluralistic conception of Europe is accompanied by the establishment of a distinctive type of 
monist depoliticisation in domestic politics. The mismatch undermines not only the credibility 
of the greater Europe project, but above all the willingness of partners to invest in a project that 
carries so many dangers of normative dilution and counter-hegemonic challenges to Atlanticist 
predominance. However, greater Europe is far more than a Russian project, and represents a 
way out of the strategic impasse in which the continent finds itself. It represents a specific mode 
of repoliticisation in which spatial and temporal transformative projects are combined. Given 
the obvious travails of the smaller Europe and the dangers of axiological conflict in the wider 
Europe, greater Europe is the potential framework for a new politics of continental 
reconciliation. Greater Europe has been stymied by the hegemonic dominance of Atlanticism 
in the post-Cold War years, but it is not incompatible with a Euro-Atlantic perspective, where 
institutionalised Gaullist continentalism becomes a structural partner and leadership is shared 
with the US.  
These three Europes are in contention, but the debate between the contrasting 
perceptions of international order that they represent remains strangely disembedded from 
contemporary theoretical debates. This is particularly evident when it comes to the wider 
Europe, lacking a substantive and coherent political subjectivity of its own (a point I shall 
return to below). The EU is today typically portrayed as a post-modern entity committed to a 
post-Westphalian agenda of universal values, accompanied by a commitment to a set of 
QRUPDWLYHSULQFLSOHV&RRSHU7KHVHQRUPVDUHWKHEDVLVIRUWKH(8¶VFRQGLWLRQDOLW\LQ
dealing with external actors and its neighbours. Internally, the EU has assumed the 
characteristics of a neo-medieval polity, with overlapping jurisdictions and no settled sovereign 
FHQWUH=LHORQND,WKDVDµIX]]\¶LGHQWLW\OLNH5XVVLDLWVHOIZLWKERWKVWUXFWXUHGDURXQG
what Laclau and Mouffe (2001) FDOOWKHµDEVHQWWRWDOLW\¶. Although Russia is usually portrayed 
as having a strong sovereign centre, its identity is also in flux and is deeply variegated 
(Khazarski and Makarchev 2015). Externally, the EU has assumed an increasingly hard spatial 
configuration in recent years. Its external borders are mostly governed by Schengen 
regulations, allowing a single visa to operate across the participant countries, although the 
pressures of refugee and migratory flows from 2014 prompted a wave of suspensions and wall-
EXLOGLQJ6DNZD,WLVVWLOOWRRHDUO\WRWDONRIDµIRUWUHVV(XURSH¶HVSHFLDOO\LQOLJKWRI
*HUPDQ\¶VGHFLVLRQLQWRDFFHSWDERXWDPLOOLRQUHIXJHHVIURP6\ULDDQGRWKHUFRQIOLFW
zones, yet the crisis threw into sharp relief the tension between socio-economic and normative 
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post-modernism and the securitisation of relations with the neighbourhood and the world. Time 
and space have come into collision.  
This brought the once crucial but recently forgotten debate over finalité back into focus. 
This is the debate over the purpose and ends of the EU. Discussion of the purpose would restore 
HOHPHQWVRIµWKHSROLWLFDO¶WR(8GLVFRXUVHZKLOHGHEDWHRYHUWKHHQGVZRXOGGRWKHVDPHDERXW
the limits to territorial expansion and the nature of the relationship to those in the liminal area 
DFURVVWKHERUGHURIWKH(8¶VIXUWKHst reaches. The political would be brought back in. Instead, 
the finalité debate has been overwhelmed by the multiple crises afflicting the EU. Instead of a 
substantive debate grounded in the political, discussion has tended to focus on the technocratic 
problem of saving the old politics. Already the struggle to save the euro has raised fundamental 
TXHVWLRQVDERXWWKH(8¶VLGHQWLW\ZKLle the Brexit vote in the UK on 23 June 2016 provides 
another opportunity to return to the finalité debate. Discussion of what sort of Europe the 
SHRSOHV RI WKH FRQWLQHQW UHDOO\ ZDQW DQG QRW WKH RQH QHFHVVDULO\ DGYDQFHG E\ (XURSH¶V
globalised elites is more than timely. As Laclau (2005) has argued, populist formulations can 
act as powerful articulations of suppressed political demands. From this perspective, populist 




the post-communist world for whom the simple ideDRIµ(XURSH¶DOUHDG\UHSUHVHQWVWKHJLYHQ
solution to their problems. In other words, as far as many of these countries are concerned, 
there is little to gain from dabbling once again in the speculative sphere of utopian projects to 
build a progressive socialist, greater Europe, or other utopia, when their problems of history 
have already been putatively resolved by the EU. There is even less demand for a substantive 
central and eastern European assertion of a separate political identity. In other words, the lifting 
of the iron curtain dividing what Jozef Piásudski in the inter-war years liked to call the 
µintermarium¶ KDV QRW UHPRYHG WKH UHJLRQ¶V SHULSKHUDOLW\ ,QVWHDG SHULSKHUDOLW\ KDV EHHQ
intensified, rendering the region a zone of contestation between powers that are centred 
elsewhere7KHUHJLRQKDVEHFRPHDIUDJPHQWDWLRQ]RQHRI(XURSHDQLVDWLRQLWVHOIµ,OOLEHUDO
GHPRFUDF\¶DQGFRQVHUYDWLYHSRSXOLVPLVJHQHUDWHGLQSDUWE\WKHSUHVVXUHVRISHULSKHUDOLW\$
(XURSHWKDWZDVJHQXLQHO\µZKROHDQGIUHH¶Zould have seen Budapest or Warsaw become the 
capital of pan-European structures guiding the functional integration of the continent from 
Lisbon to Vladivostok, accompanied by the dialogical project for the emancipation of the 
continent from Cold War structures and ideas. 
,QVWHDG µ(XURSH¶ LWVHOIEHFDPHWKHXWRSLDRIDSHFXOLDUO\HYLVFHUDWHGDQGSROLWLFDOO\
bloodless sort. The temporal aspiration for a more effective developmental model assumed a 
sharply delineated spatial configuration. Enlargement reinforced the death of the political and 
relegitimised the axiological politics of the present.  Historical solutions that worked very well 
up to 1989 were mechanically applied to a very different post-Cold War context. With the 
multiple problems besetting the EULWFRXOGEHFRPHRQHPRUHRIWKHµ*RGVWKDWIDLOHG¶7KLV
is the bitter dilemma now facing Ukraine. Having staked so much on the European utopia, it 
finds itself in a peculiar dystopia of its own making. The Ukraine crisis was the ineluctable 
consequence of a depoliticised Europeanism that was unable to address fundamental problems 
of European security and community. Instead of an agonistic political debate about the finalité 
RI(XURSHLQDV\OORJLVWLFPDQQHUµ(XURSH¶ZDVSUHVHQWHGDVWKHGHSROLWLFLVHGUHsponse to the 
crises of Europe. 
 




In the post-Cold War era European politics has taken on an increasingly axiological character. 
A monological approach, where substantive political questions are considered resolved in 
advance, generates a politics of closure in which certain fundamentals are considered axiomatic 
and not open to contestation. Conditionality is a politics of one-sided adaptation. The European 
method of development laid down by Jean Monnet explicitly sought to depoliticise certain 
issues, and functionalist approach that sought precisely to negate the political. The result was 
a distinctive type of monism. When it comes to the wider Europe, axiology reduced the scope 
for engagement with the political subjectivities of others. Axiological politics assumes that 
some things have been settled outside of the political process, and thus politics becomes a means 
for the implementation of a priori positions. Its ideological aspect assumes that answers have 
already been found to questions of human community. Politics become instrumental, and thus 
deprived of what many have argued is its agonistic essence: the organised and constrained 
struggle over fundamental matters of concern in the life of the community. Axiological politics 
denigrates the political subjectivity of actors, whether individuals, larger groupings or the entire 
state. 
At the conceptual level, axiological politics can take several distinct, but typically inter-
related, forms. Conspirology is one powerful form of axiological politics, based on victimhood 
and persecution by malign but often unstated forces. Populism is also typically characterised by 
an axiological dimension, with the stark contrast drawn between inherent popular wisdom and 
the trickery of elites. The notion of course is an ideal type, and public affairs will always contain 
an irreducible quotient of axiological politics. Nevertheless, the democratic ideal suggests that 
this can be tempered by the structured engagement of different political subjects in a 
µFRPPXQLFDWLYH¶ SURFHVV DV -UJHQ +DEHUPDV (1984, 1987) has long argued. However, 
dialogical politics differs in some significant respects froP +DEHUPDV¶V FRPPXQLFDWLYH
LQWHUDFWLRQV)LUVWLWGLVSHQVHVZLWKWKHLPSOLFLWKLHUDUFK\RIUHODWLRQVLQ+DEHUPDV¶VWKHRU\VHHQ
so notably in his discussion of post-secularism, where the views of the others are engaged because 
they exist, but are treated in a condescending manner (Ratzinger and Habermas 2007). In other 
words, the views of the other are to be respected, but essentially they are considered from the 
perspective of a superior us. Boundaries are reinforced and not challenged. Second, the 
communicative process is implicitly founded on the idea of settled identities, and thus the 
problem of liminality is not adequately integrated into the theory. In the case of Russia this is 
particularly important, since the country over recent decades has been engaged in an intense 
process of identity formation. It not a settled interlocutor but retains a deeply liminal character, 
which remains in flux and is torn by deeply contested representations of the ideal (Chebankova 
2017). 
Axiological politics stands in contrast, to borrow a term from Mikhail Bakhtin, with 
what can be called a dialogical process. The idea of dialogical politics seeks to shift attention 
from the institutional level, where executives will always seek to achieve axiological outcomes, 
and where legislatures also by definition engage in some sort of dialogical process, to more 
fundamental categories dealing with the quality of political relationships and various modes of 
engagement with the political process itself. This provides an ontology of European unity based 
not on the language of common values (although of course not repudiating these values), nor 
on a Realpolitik reversion to the language of interests (although not neglecting the creation of 
alliances based on the genuine commonality of concerns and operating through common 
practices of diplomacy), but rather on a common public sphere based on a dialogical process 
and a substantive idea of a European political community. In other words, it may be possible 
to escape from the crisis of European integration not by reverting to the traditional sovereignty 
of nation states but by moving forwards towards a pan-European pluralist identity.  
This potentially provides a way out of the monological trap into which the EU and 
European politics in general have fallen. It would avoid the process where the EU sets itself up 
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as a teacher to others (Prozorov 2016). The tutelary politics of the EU is particularly in evidence 
when dealing with the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries, and this was one reason why Russia 
from the first refused to be part of the undifferentiated group of European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) states. Instead, dialogism is politics that transcends the logic of incommensurable 
duality ± the duality of the privileged self interacting through conditionality and tutelage with 
the other. It is thus a paradoxical politics, because dialogue assumes a conversation between at 
least two parties of recognised similar discursive status, and thus substantiates what is still to 
be established. It is the failure to resolve this paradox that has fostered a monistic relationship 
between the EU and non-EU others in the post-communist world. In the European context, it 
implies the creation of a substantive political community, with recognition of the validity of 
the political subjectivity of the interlocutor. It is ambivalence over the latter question that has 
EHGHYLOOHG5XVVLD¶VUHODWLRQVZLWKWKH(8DQGWKH:HVWVLQFHWKHHQGRIWKH&ROG War. 
Since emerging as an independent state in 1991 Russia has tried to join the historical 
West as an equal partner. This is founded on *RUEDFKHY¶VEHOLHIWKDWWKHHQGRIWKH&ROG:DU
provided an opportunity for the substantive transformation of European political community. 
The main institutions of the Atlantic system ± the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) ± ZRXOGLQ5XVVLD¶VYLHZEHFRPHSDUWRIDJUHDWHU(XURSH5XVVLDZRXOG
join the historical West and thereby transform it into something else by virtue of its 
membership. What for Russia was considered a moment of expansion of the political, there 
was no need for such a dialogical relationship for the existing members of the old West, and 
instead administrative and normative enlargement substituted for a programme of 
transformation. There were genuine fears that opening the established Atlantic community to 
the political could dilute the normative and institutional framework of the existing order, but 
by closing down avenues for agonistic transformation, the community itself became 
increasingly stultified, and in the end even threatened its existence. The fate of the Soviet Union 
began to hang over the future of the EU and the Atlantic community as a whole. 
7KH µHQG RI KLVWRU\¶ EHFDPH WKH LGHRORJ\ RI WKH GHDWK RI WKH SROLWLFDO 7KH SRVW-
communist world, including Russia, was expected simply to adapt to the pre-established norms 
accompanied by the hierarchy of power in which they were embedded. For the established 
PHPEHUV RI WKH µKLVWRULFDO :HVW¶ WKH IDOO RI WKH FRPPXQLVW V\VWHPV RQO\ UHYDOLGDWHG WKH
success of the old politics, and thus there was no need to engage in transformation or expose 
themselves to the dangers that would accompany the restoration of the political at the 
continental and global level. How can there be genuine dialogue where one side claims to have 
resolved certain problems of history and development, and the other side was heir to a system 
that had palpably failed? The post-Cold War settlement appropriated, to paraphrase Carl 
Schmitt, the concept of humanity (now designated as human rights). Schmitt (1996, 54) warned 
WKDWµZKRHYHULQYRNHVKXPDQLW\ZDQWVWRFKHDW¶. He warns of the political consequenFHVµ7R
confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a term probably has certain 
incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him 
to be an enemy of humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the PRVWH[WUHPHLQKXPDQLW\¶
(Schmitt 1996, 54). This is the ideational framework for a politics of enlargement, premised on 
conditionality and adaptation, accompanied by the suppression of the agonistic politics of 
transformation and renewal. 
The anti-revolutions of 1989-1991 opened up the potential for a dialogical form of 
SROLWLFV RQFH WKH D[LRORJLFDO VWUXFWXUHV RI WKH &ROG :DU KDG EHHQ WUDQVFHQGHG $Q µDQWL-
UHYROXWLRQ¶ LV KHUH GHILQHG DV D SROLWLFDO SUDFWLFH WKDW QRW RQO\ UHSXGLDWHV D SDUWLFXODU
revolutionary cycle, but aims to transcend the axiological features of the revolutionary process 
(Sakwa 1998; Sakwa in Donald and Rees 2001).  Instead, the following period was one of 




politics. The agonistic search for new answers to new questions gave way to the reinforcement 
of a settlement that preceded the end of the conflict. Although the Helsinki follow-up conferences 
played an important part in bringing the Cold War to a negotiated end and provided the normative 
framework for the transformation of the conflict, the selective reification of the Helsinki Final 
Act of August 1QRWDEO\LWVµWKLUGEDVNHW¶GHDOLQJZLWKKXPDQULJKWVforeclosed debate. For 
the Kremlin, it came to be seen a way of imposing a power hierarchy which Russia increasingly 
found unacceptable. The anticipated openness of European geopolitics at the end of the Cold War 
was not accompanied by a commensurate dialogical negotiation of a new political settlement. 
In the end, the perpetuation of the ideological and institutional structures of the Cold War 
gave rise to the cold peace (Sakwa 2013). Claims to sovereign equality were not matched by the 
substantive recognition of diversity and recognition of difference. European monism took the 
IRUP RI D µFLYLOLVLQJ PLVVLRQ¶ =LHORQND  Dialogue entails some sort of binary 
functionality, but it also requires respect for difference and thus some sort of methodological 
equality; a type of isomorphic unity created by a discussion between equals where the views 
of the interlocutor are respected and given equal weight. In a monological discourse, one of the 
parties (or both), considers itself normatively, and thus ontologically, superior to the 
interlocutor, and thus a series of mimetic relationships are established, including the process 
whereby one actor sets themselves up as teacher to the other. Contrary to the view that domestic 
politics shapes foreign policy, the post-communist era is characterised by the peculiar inversion 
whereby a country that pursues a monist policy at home calls for a pluralistic world order; 




The sources and configuration of contemporary European depoliticised monism take four main 
forms, here presented in schematic terms. First, the way that the Cold War ended, and 
XOWLPDWHO\WKHLPSRVLWLRQRIDWULXPSKDOµYLFWRU\¶GLVFRXUVHRQZKDWKDGEHHQDVVXPHGE\WKH
Soviet side to be a common victory. The turning point was the December 1989 Malta Summit, 
which brought Soviet leader Gorbachev and President George H. W. Bush together to decide 
WKHIDWHRI(XURSH7KHDEVHQFHRID(XURSHDQOHDGHUKLJKOLJKWHG(XURSH¶VVXEDOWHUQVWDWXVDQG
failure to gain a substantive independent political subjectivity in the post-Cold War era. As at 
Yalta in February 1945, the great powers held the fate of Europe in their hands, but Malta 
registered the change in the diplomatic and strategic balance of power. Gorbachev understood 
that the Cold War stand-off between the Soviet Union and the Western powers served to 
undermine the development of both. With the end of the Cold War, it seemed that a new era of 
peace was at hand, reinforced by the reunification of the European continent. Gorbachev 
envisaged that the Soviet Union would remain a great power, but now one that worked 
FRRSHUDWLYHO\ZLWKWKH:HVW/DWHU5XVVLDQOHDGHUVKRSHGWRMRLQWKHµKLVWRULFDO:HVW¶DVDQ
HTXDOPHPEHUDQGWKXVFUHDWHDµJUHDWHU:HVW¶WKHFRXQWHUSDUWRIJUHDWHU(XURSH 
At Malta, Gorbachev tried to formalise a politics of transcendence that would overcome 
not just the historically contingent Cold War but herald an anti-revolutionary politics of 
reconciliation that would challenge the very structure of hegemonic power politics. In the 
event, the summit registered only a power shift within the framework of the politics of Yalta, 
but with a reversed polarity. The opportunity for a common victory was squandered. The 
conditions were created that ultimately exploded in Ukraine in 2014. The countries that had 
EHFRPHWKH6RYLHW8QLRQ¶VXQZLOOLQJDOOLHVODWHUEHFDPHWKHPRVWHQWKXVLDVWLFVXSSRUWHUVRI
Atlanticism. This only reinforced the axiological monism embedded in the politics of Malta. 
Instead of transcendence, a restated bloc politics reinforced the alleged victory of the West 
accompanied by the Atlantic overlay. This reinforced the axiological dynamic to the end of the 
Cold War, accompanied later by elements of Western triumphalism (despite enduring attempts 
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to sweeten the bitter pill for Russia). For some these sweeteners, like the creation of the NATO-
Russia Council, represented little more than appeasement and a failure to exploit Western 
victory (Kasparov and Greengard 2015).  
Second, the Malta agreements built on the Helsinki Final Act and were codified in 
1RYHPEHULQWKHµ&KDUWHURI3DULV IRUD1HZ(XURSH¶DQGLWV ULQJLQJGHFODUDWLRQRID
µ(XURSHZKROHDQGIUHH¶+HOVLQNLKDGFRQILUPHG<DOWDDERYHDOOWKHERUGHUVHVWDEOLVKHGLQ
1945 and the framework for the conduct of relations between the great powers, but at the same 
WLPH+HOVLQNL¶VKXPDQULJKWVFRPPLWPHQWVSURYLGHGDPHFKDQLVPIRU WKH WUDQVFHQGHQFHRI
<DOWD 7KH SDUDGR[ LV WKDW WKDW +HOVLQNL HVWDEOLVKHG D SDUWLFXODU PHWKRG IRU <DOWD¶V
transcendence, which itself ultimately proved corrosive of post-Cold War international 
relationships. In a Schmittian manner, E. H. Carr argued that the mix of idealism and realism 
in the interwar years proved fatal, preventing the exercise of traditional diplomacy while 
inhibiting rHDOLVWLFDSSUHFLDWLRQVRIWKHSRZHUFRQVHTXHQFHVRIRQH¶VRZQDFWLRQV&DUU
In other words, the established framework inhibited the exploration of new forms of 
engagement and differentiation through the political.  
While the Soviet Union and Russia endorsed the principles inspiring the Charter of 
Paris, the perceived instrumental and selective application of these principles by the dominant 
powers created a situation in which the normal diplomatic intercourse between nations was 
distorted by normativH DJHQGDV 7KH EDODQFH EHWZHHQ µUHJLPH WUDQVIRUPHUV¶ DQG µSRZHU
EDODQFHUV¶FXUUHQWO\ODEHOOHGOLEHUDOLQWHUYHQWLRQLVWVDQGUHDOLVWVZDVGLVUXSWHGDQGDOORZHG
regime transformers to predominate (Goldgeier and McFaul 2003). Values in one way or 
another are an inalienable part of the currency of contemporary international relations, but 
diplomacy means that they are tempered by the pursuit of mutual interests. The radicalisation 
of the democratisation and human rights agenda by the Atlantic powers provoked a range of 
defensive reactions in Russia, which in the end weakened the democratic impulse. The idea of 
µVRYHUHLJQGHPRFUDF\¶ZDVRQO\RQHPDQLIHVWDWLRQRIWKHVHDUFKIRUDQDXWRFKWKRQRXVEDODQFH
between adaptation to international norms and the search for some sort of authentic native 
tradition to sustain post-communist political order. The problem can be couched in various 
ways, but in general terms it is a variant of the enduring tension between Enlightenment 
universalism and nativist particularism. It is also indicative of the tension between the monism 
of the axiological political style and the transformative pluralism of political dialogism. 
 The third determining factor shaping the cold peace and its ultimate degeneration into 
the so-called new Cold War is the failure of Europe to assume an independent political 
subjectivity. In his Strasbourg speech and later Gorbachev argued for the transcendence of 
Yalta and Malta. He sought to create a European form of international relations that 
encompassed the interests of both the small and great powers. This is a multipolar Europe with 
space for experimentation and diversity. The zone of intense integration in the EU would be 
just one element in the multiverse of a multipolar European architecture. Instead, the EU 
effectively claimed to be the sole legitimate voice of Europe, although in partnership with the 
more specialised Council of Europe and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE). The wider Europe project became part of the expansion of the broader Atlantic 
community. This is a monist vision of Europe, which cannot imagine any substantive 
alternative political, let alone ideational, alternative community. Just as liberalism in the post-
Cold War era finds it hard to accept alternatives to its own hegemony, and thus erodes it own 
liberality (Horsfield 2017), so the Atlantic community failed to devise a form of engagement 
with outsiders that would mitigate rather than radicalise their outsiderness. In the case of 
Russia, the assumption that the way that historical problems had been resolved in one context 
were generically applicable to others was anathema. Even if a leadership in Russia were to 
accept this theoretical postulate (as it did to a large extent in the Boris Yeltsin years), the fact 
that historical problems of territorial unity, political identity, security cooperation, economic 
10 
 
modernisation and international integration have still not been resolved means that tensions, if 
not conflict, would inevitably emerge.  
 Fourth, the failure to find an appropriate way for Russia and its neighbours to interact 
stimulated isolation rather than integration. Numerous earlier attempts to give institutional 
form to Eurasian integration in the post-Cold War years culminated in the creation of the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) on 1 January 2015. This formalised the antagonism between 
two major integration projects, although the EEU was always intended to act as one of the 
pillars of greater Europe. The essence of the cold peace between 1989 and 2014 was the endless 
struggle between the great powers and the EU for influence in post-Soviet Eurasia. The final 
VWUDZ IURP 5XVVLD¶V SHUVSHFWLYH ZDV WKH SHUFHLYHG DWWHPSW WR ZUHVW 8NUDLQH DZD\ IURP
0RVFRZ¶V HFRQRPLF DQG VHFXULW\ VSKHUH =Eigniew Brzezinski¶V DUJXPHQW LQ  WKDW µ,W
cannot be stressed strongly enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but 
with Ukraine suborned and the subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an HPSLUH¶
(Brzezinski 1994, 80) gave early warning of the stakes involved. Russian intervention in 
Ukraine in 2014 is perceived by the West to represent a violent challenge to the system of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ+RZHYHUIURPWKH.UHPOLQ¶VSHUVSHFWLYH± and, it must be said, from the 




Monism and finalité 
 
Decades of enlargement pushed the EU into uncharted territory, in both symbolic and political 
terms (Zielonka 2008). The expansionary dynamic through accession has now slowed, but 
there is no finalité in either spatial or normative terms. The EU remains an ambitious 
transformative agent in what are increasingly contested neighbourhoods (Rumelli 2004). The 
confrontation between the EU and Russia is one that neither wanted, and which both sought to 
avoid. The EU devised variegated neighbourhood policies to ensure that the outer limits of EU 
territory did not harden into new lines of division. Romano Prodi, the president of the European 
Commission, when introducing the ENP in Brussels on 5-'HFHPEHUGHFODUHGWKDWµ,
ZDQW WRVHHD³ULQJRIIULHQGV´surrounding the Union and its closest European neighbours, 
IURP0RURFFRWR5XVVLDDQGWKH%ODFN6HD¶3URGL+HZHQWRQWRDUJXHWKDWWKLVZRXOG
HQFRPSDVVµHYHU\WKLQJEXWWKHLQVWLWXWLRQV¶DIRUPXODWLRQZKLFKRQO\H[DFHUEDWHGWKHSUREOHP
that the wider Europe agenda was intended to address. 
7KH(13VRXJKWWRPHGLDWHEHWZHHQWKHLQVDQGRXWVDVSDUWRIWKH(8¶VSHUPDQHQW
negotiation of boundaries and interactions with neighbours (Whitman and Wolff 2010). With 
the mass accession of a number of post-communist countries, most of which had been part of 
the Soviet bloc or even of the Soviet Union itself, in 2004 and 2007, the character of this 
µQHJRWLDWLRQ¶FKDQJHGDQGLWEHFDPHOHVVRIDQLQWHUDFWLYHSURFHVVWRWKHGHJUHHWKDWLWHYHU
was), and became more didactic. The specific manifestation of this new didacticism was the 
launching of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) LQ0D\DQLGHDVSRQVRUHGE\VRPHRI5XVVLD¶V
most resolute critics in Poland and Sweden (Copsey and Pomorska 2014). Although tempered 
by Brussels, the EaP combined the normative and spatial challenge that the EU posed to its 
neighbours. The tension between the universalistic aspirations of the EU as a post-modern 
norm-based project and the physical manifestation of the EU as a territorially-based entity 
permanently negotiating its physical engagement with neighbours was exacerbated (Browning 
2005).  
Engagement deploys a range of traditional diplomatic and other instruments, 
accompanied by a dynamic of adaptation-based conditionality that tempers realist interactions. 
As the EU grew and embraced the post-communist region, its dualism became increasingly 
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delineated to expose the tensions between norms and space. Both lost their original 
transformational impetus. The norms were tempered and modified as conditionality itself in 
FHUWDLQFLUFXPVWDQFHVEHFDPHµFRQGLWLRQDO¶GHSHQGHQWRQVSHFLILFORFDOFRQGLWLRQVWKLVLVWKH
charge, for example, about the accession of Estonia and Latvia with a large number of 
SUHGRPLQDQWO\5XVVLDQµQRQ-FLWL]HQV¶(Kochenov 2008). And when it came to space, instead 
RIWUDQVFHQGLQJWKHµERUGHUQHVV¶RIERUGHUVwhich it had achieved with such success among 
the original members of the European Economic Community (EEC), borders were back with a 
vengeance%XWWKHVHZHUHµSRVW-PRGHUQ¶ERUGHUVQRZPDQLIHVWHGDVWKHµIURQWLHU¶EHWZHHQ
the empire of good governance and all that was normatively progressive, and the dark and 
savage lands of corruption and neo-Sovietism on the other side. The new east European 
member states turned out to be much harsher pedagogues than the realist-inclined old 
Europeans (Mälksoo 2013, 158-9). 
Not surprisingly, relations with Russia soured and an increasingly overt struggle for 
influence intensified in the so-FDOOHG µVKDUHG QHLJKERXUKRRG¶ WKH WUDGLWLRQDO ERUGHUODQGV
between the two major zones of Europe in the intermarium between the Baltic and Black Seas 
(DeBardeleben 2008). For the EU, this meant that pragmatism threatened to undermine its 
normative idealism as hard choices had to be made when dealing with a new type of recalcitrant 
regimes. It had hitherto been mostly plain sailing for the EU, extending its influence to regions 
that welcomed the EU as the path to political and economic modernisation. The complexities 
of the Balkans were a foretaste of the problems to come, but for the first time in the intermarium 
the EU came up against a rival hegemonic enterprise. A new mode of engagement was called 
for, one more sensitive to ideational pluralism and developmental ambiguities. After all, the 
Soviet Union had also been a progressive combination of time and space, and had delivered a 
W\SHRIPRGHUQLVDWLRQ7KH(8¶VPRGHORIQRUPDWLYHVXSHULRULW\DQGWUDQVFHQGHQFHRIVSDFH
could not but be ambivalently inserted into a region that had already experienced the 
ambiguities and contradictions of such a project. Contestation in the intermarium was thus far 
from purely geopolitical, and even its designation as civilisational is inadequate (Huntington 
1993). The struggle is over developmental models, representations of the past, and above all, 
about didacticism and autonomy. 
The crisis encompasses the geographical borderlands between the EU and Russia as 
well as broader understanding of the contemporary European order. Temporal and spatial 
configurations have come into conflict. The monism of the EU combines both dimensions. In 
terms of space, engagement with non-EU countries has been monological and pedagogical ± 
the engagement and learning has been entirely one way, with EurRSH¶VQHLJKERXUVKDYLQJWR
DGDSWWRWKH(8RQWKHODWWHU¶VWHUPV7KHORJLFRI(XURSHDQLQWHJUDWLRQDQGWKHZLGHU(XURSH
agenda is hostile to difference, and instead assumes a uniform process of enlargement, however 
differentiated the actual integration mechanisms. This uniformity is imposed as the price to pay 
to take advantage of what the EU has to offer, above all an enormous market and a set of 
regulatory, political and human rights norms that offer the prospect for dynamic liberal 
capitalist development. The push for a more differentiated approach towards the eastern 
neighbourhood (see below) was belated recognition of the excessive monism of earlier policies.   
The EU engages in a deeply transformative relationship with its neighbours, demanding 
DFFHSWDQFHRIWKHVXEDOWHUQUHODWLRQVKLSRISXSLOWRWKH(8¶VWHDFKHU7KHLQHYLWDEOHKLHUDUFK\
proved unacceptable to 5XVVLD 7KH (8¶V µQRUPDWLYH LPSHULDOLVP¶ XQGHU-estimated the 
specificities of the EaP region and the potential for conflict with Russia (Pänke, 2015). Critics 
DUJXHWKDW5XVVLD¶VUHIXVDOWRHQJDJHLQWKHWUDQVIRUPDWLYHSURFHVVSURYRNHGWKHEUHDNGRZQ
whereas the question can be posed as one of autonomy, both in terms of political sovereignty 
and of historical experience. Member States may have resolved a range of historical problems 
within the format of the EU, but this does not automatically translate into solutions for a country 
as vast and complex as Russia. Incommensurate understandings of the challenges posed by 
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contemporary temporality have shifted onto the plane of spatial confrontation in the 
borderlands. International relations were reduced to a form of depoliticised governmentality 
(Neumann and Sending, 2007). 
 The failure to establish a dialogue of difference between the actually existing 
components of Europe provoked the breakdown of 2014. The ascription of a certain non-
Europeanness to Russia ± with Europe described in the monist terms outlined above ± inhibited 
the instantiation of a dialogical relationship in which both the European self and the Russian 
other could have engaged in a mutual learning process (Neumann, 1999). The view that there 
is not much that the EU can learn from Russia is valid to the degree that learning is restricted 
to a narrow platform of normative and institutional interactions, whereas a broader learning 
agenda would include the problem of how multiple entities can create a fruitful relationship on 
the continent. For this a pan-continental greater Europe agenda complements the Brussels-
centric wider European agenda. The beginning of any learning process is acknowledgment of 
the need to learn. Prozorov (2016, 183) argues that this requires the EU to accept the existence 
of a European political space broader than the space integrated (in whatever manner) by the 
(8µDVSDFHLQZKLFKWKH(8LQWHUDFWVDVDQ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO´UDWKHUWKDQD³GRPHVWLF´DFWRU
with other European actors, which, unlike the EU, are sovereign states, but no less equal to the 
(8LQWKHFRPPRQVSDFHRISOXUDOLVWLFLQWHUDFWLRQ¶. This would shift the basis of relations away 
IURP5XVVLD¶VµSUREOHPDWLFVWDWXV¶LQWKHIUDPHZRUNRI(XURSHDQLQWHJUDWLRQWRZDUGVDSURMHFW
ZKHUH WKH µORJLF RI FRPPRQ (XURSHDQ SOXUDOLVP VHHNV WR PDLQWDLQ (XURSH DV D VSDFH RI
pluralistic interaction, in which commonality is ensured by the mutual recognition of legitimate 
GLIIHUHQFHDQGWKHUHOD[DWLRQRIWKHULJLGGHOLPLWDWLRQRIRQWRSRORJLFDOLGHQWLWLHV¶Prozorov 
2016, 184). This would be a common European home with many rooms but still recognisable 
as a single community. 
 
Towards political dialogism 
 
The logic of the transcendence of the Cold War accentuated the monological, and thus 
axiological, character of contemporary world and European politics. This entails a number of 
depoliticised and bureaucratised practices. In this era of mimetic politics, the form is preserved 
but the substance of what makes politics political has been lost. While liberalism suggests that 
rational debate between relatively equal subjectivities can lead to rational consensus, Schmitt 
DVVHUWHGWKDWWKHHVVHQFHRIWKHSROLWLFDOZDVWKHFUHDWLRQRIDµZH¶LQRSSRVLWLRQWRWKH
µRWKHU¶7KHIULHQG-enemy relation is what fundamentally defines the political. This is seen at its 
sharpest in various forms of axiological politics. The counter-position to this axiological style of 
politics is political dialogism. It seeks to establish a space for autonomy and resistance to the 
dominance of the social forms of the hegemonic regime at the international and national levels, 
DQGVHHNVWRJLYHUHFRJQLWLRQWRWKHSROLWLFDOVXEMHFWLYLW\RI WKHµRWKHU¶7KLVLV WKHµDJRQLVWLF
SOXUDOLVP¶DGYDQFHGE\0RXIIHSS-8). Contemporary European politics is characterised 
by the tension between these two definitions of the political. In this debate, Schmittean realism 
is ranged alongside post-Cold War monistic liberalism, but is challenged by traditional versions 
of liberal pluralism. The historicism that was incorporated into hegemonic Atlanticism after 1989 
encountered in Russia an anti-hegemonic politics of resistance. 
The EU moved towards a more differentiated policy towards its Eastern neighbours 
following the Ukraine crisis, but this remains far from a genuine dialogical relationship. The 
fourth Eastern Partnership summit in Riga on 21-22 May 2015 focused on the principles of 
µGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQDQGLQFOXVLYLW\¶7KH-RLQW'HFODUDWLRQDIILUPHGµWKHVRYHUHLJQULJKWRIHDFK
partner freely to choose the level of ambition and the goals to which it aspires in its relations 
ZLWKWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶DQGWKHUHZDVDQHZHPSKDVLVRQµGLIIHUHQWLDWHGUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQ
WKH(8DQGLWVVL[VRYHUHLJQLQGHSHQGHQWSDUWQHUV¶(8&RXQFLOThe tone of the revised 
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EU Global Strategy adopted by the European Council on 28 June 2016 dropped the language 
of partnership with Russia and instead a stern and didactic tone predominated (EU 2016). The 
6WUDWHJ\GHFODUHGWKDWµ3ULQFLSOHGSUDJPDWLVPZLOOJXLGHRXUH[WHUQDODFWLRQLQWKH\HDUVDKHDG¶
(EU 2016, 8). There was less emphasis on the ENP, and instead the focus was on fostering the 
µUHVLOLHQFH¶RIQHLJKERXULQJVWDWHVDFFRPSDQLHGE\WKHDVVHUWLRQRIWKHµVWUDWHJLFDXWRQRP\¶RI
the EU (EU 2016, 4), accompanied by a deeper partnership with NATO. None of this betokened 
DPRYHDZD\IURPWKHD[LRORJLFDOVW\OHRISROLWLFVEXWUHSUHVHQWHGQRPRUHWKDQDµVPDUWHU¶
monism.  
The substance of a dialogical politics is the recognition of equal political subjectivity for 
political actors. In international affairs this means overcoming limited sovereignty regimes in 
favour of the recognition of multiple centres of civilisational and political identity. This is the 
multipolarity that has long been propounded by Russian leaders, and was argued for by Schmitt 
in his notion of the pluriverse (Schmitt 2006). Geopolitics is certainly fundamental to post-Cold 
War axiology, but dialogical politics entails a double movement: countering the logic of 
axiological politics in the international sphere accompanied by revalorisation of substantive 
political community in domestic matters. The two are profoundly inter-connected, and effectively 
part of a single process. Contemporary dialogical politics are inspired by a number of ideas and 
characterised by a number of practices. 
The Enlightenment as a project is often considered to have an inherent monological 
dimension, countered according to some critics by the luxurious pluralism of postmodernity and 
postsecularity (Caputo 2001)$WWKHKHDUWRIWKHµPRQRORJXHRIWKH(QOLJKWHQPHQW¶LVLWs anti-
religiosity, which in the end presents an eviscerated representation of individual freedom 
(Kyrlezhev 2008, 24). Hans-*HRUJ *DGDPHU¶V (2004) H[SORUDWLRQV LQ µSKLORVRSKLFDO
KHUPHQHXWLFV¶LQSDUWLFXODUWKHVWDWXVRINQRZOHGJHKDGDOUHDG\FULWLFLVHGWKHDWWHPSWWRUHGXFH
the study of the humanities to the methods of the natural sciences. Of greater importance for our 
SXUSRVHV LV KLV ZRUN RQ µGLDORJXH DQG GLDOHFWLF¶ *DGDPHU  DV ZHOO DV HVVD\V RQ µWKH
UHOHYDQFHRIWKHEHDXWLIXO¶*DGDPHU+LVIRFXVRQSDUWLFXODULW\DQGVSHFLILFLW\ZLWKLQD
dynamic whole opens up the potential for value pluralism within the bounds of an expansive 
SROLWLFDORUGHU$ERYHDOO%DNKWLQ¶VVWXGLHVRIFXOWXUDOIRUPVNQRZOHGJHDQGVRFLHW\SURYLGHDQ
original approach to the relationship of the individual and society (Clark and Holquist 1984). 
%DNKWLQ¶VLQWHrpretation of the dialogical focuses on the way that humans use language, and he 
advanced a dialogical concept of its use. It is on this basis that Michael Holquist coined the term 
µGLDORJLVP¶DZRUGWKDW%DNKWLQQHYHUXVHG+ROTXLVWQRWHV%DNKWLQ¶VDWWUDFWLRQWR
the neo-Kantian Marburg school, and in particular the works of Hermann Cohen, for its emphasis 
on unity and oneness; accompanied by his lifelong preoccupation with the problem of dialogue. 
The neo-Kantian concern with overcoming the duaOLW\EHWZHHQµPLQG¶DQGµVSLULW¶LQ%DNKWLQ¶V
thinking took a distinctive turn:  
 
In dialogism, the very capacity to have consciousness is based on otherness. This 
otherness is not merely a dialectical alienation on its way to a sublation that will endow 
it with a unifying identity in higher consciousness. On the contrary: in dialogism 
consciousness is otherness. More accurately, it is the differential relation between a center 
and all that is not that center (Holquist 1990, 18). 
 
For our purposes, the political import is clear: inherent in dialogue is the constitution of distinct 
subjectivities, with a valance that is innate and not created by the relationship with the central 
RWKHUDOWKRXJKIRU%DNKWLQWKHVHOILVQHYHUDQLQGHSHQGHQWFRQVWUXFWEXWµGLDORJLF¶DUHODWLRQ
(Holquist 1990, +HQFHµ'LDORJLVPLVDIRUPRIDUFKLWHFWRQLFVWKHJHQHUDOVFLHQFHRIRUGHULQJ
SDUWV LQWR D ZKROH ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV DUFKLWHFWRQLFV LV WKH VFLHQFH RI UHODWLRQV¶ D SHUPDQHQWO\
dynamic set of ratios and proportions (Holquist 1990, 29). To put it simply, the self is to society 
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what words are to language (Holquist 1990, 31). The neo-Kantian element is clearly problematic, 
since it is one of the foundational well-springs for post-FRPPXQLVWPRQLVP\HW LQ%DNKWLQ¶V
conception oneness is far from reduction to singularity but assumes a pluralistic dynamic 
generating unity out of diversity. 
 In his studies of Dostoevsky, Bakhtin argues that dialogue is not a means to an end, but 
is the core of action itself. The variegated voices constitute a dialogical entity, which is very 
GLIIHUHQW IURPDGLDOHFWLFDO UHODWLRQVKLS$V%DNKWLQSXW LW µ7DNHDGLDORJXHDQG UHPRYH WKH
voices (the partitioning of voices), remove the intonations (emotional and individualizing ones), 
carve out abstract concepts and judgments from living words and responses, cram everything 
into one abstract consciousness ± DQGWKDW¶VKRZ\RXJHWGLDOHFWLFV¶%DNKWLQLQ(PHUVRQDQG
Holquist 1986, 147). Hwa Yol Jung, who cites the above text, comments on this as follows: 
µ+HJHO¶V³WKHRUHWLFLVP´DQG0DU[¶V³LGHRORJLVP´DUHHTXDOO\GRJPDWLFEHFDXVHWKH\IRUHFORVH





Hans-*HRUJH*DGDPHU«WRVD\WKDWWKHKHDUWRIGLDORJLFDOKHUPHneutics is the possibility that 
WKH2WKHUPLJKWEHULJKW¶ Yol Jung 1998, 108). Where teleological liberalism and historicist 
Marxism as the two great political organising principles of our age have clearly exhausted much 
of their potential to provide intelligibility to our world, let alone to provide an emancipatory and 
FULWLFDOGULYHGLDORJLVPHPHUJHVDVDQHZµLVP¶ZLWKFUHDWLYHVFRSHWRJHQHUDWHLGHDVDERXWWKH
substance of political community encompassing heteronomous political subjectivities and 
sovereignties. In other words, liberal pluralism is back on the agendaHYHQLIWDNHVµSRVW-OLEHUDO¶






Societies caught in the toils of accelerated transformation are by definition seen as incomplete 
and unformed, requiring a civilisational and didactic adaptation to norms generated elsewhere, 
and thus their political subjectivity is automatically treated as inferior. While Hayek had critiqued 
the idea of taxis (a social order made by design, accessible to human intelligence), to which he 
counterpoised the idea of cosmos (a spontaneously evolving and unplanned social order, not fully 
accessible to human intelligence), with the socialist projects for human amelioration, it is the 
post-communist creation of capitalist democracy that ended up being the most spectacular taxis 
of our time. The political subjectivity of other countries, such as Iran, which have long been 
engaged with coming to terms with modernity on the basis of civilizational autonomy, are 
denigrated for rather different reasons ± above all their stubborn pursuit of their own form of 
modernity and the means to defend themselves. As far as Europe is concerned, it is Russia which 
continues to act as the collective repository for the collective violence, pedagogical aspirations 
and target of European values.  
An exploration of the distinction between axiological and dialogical politics allows a 
more nuanced understanding of political processes today, at both the domestic and international 
level. The distinction between forms of rule, the forma imperii, and the mode of rule, forma 
regiminis, allows us to identify one of the most salient features of contemporary domestic and 
international politics, the intensification of axiological politics. The style of politics is as 
important as the formal LQVWLWXWLRQDODQGQRUPDWLYHIUDPHZRUN(YHQWKHPRVWµGHPRFUDWLF¶RU
µOLEHUDO¶ JRYHUQPHQW RU RSSRVLWLRQ PRYHPHQW FDQ HQJDJH LQ D[LRORJLFDO SROLWLFV; while an 
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ostensibly authoritarian constitution can be managed in a relatively dialogical manner. This has 
become an issue of increasing concern in the comparative democratisation literature, above all 
WKURXJK LQFUHDVHG LQWHUHVW LQ µTXDOLW\ RI GHPRFUDF\¶ LVVXHV for example, 2¶'RQQHOO HW DO
2004). Opposition to an authoritarian order is not in and of itself normatively able to transcend 
axiological practices, and tends to reinforce them in new forms. The Leninist wing of the 
Bolshevik Party is an extreme example of the application of axiological politics in both 
opposition and power. The repudiation of the communist order in 1989-1991 in the end became 
a counter-revolution rather than an anti-revolution. As is so often the case, the practices of the 
other against which the revolution was directed were reincorporated into the new ruling order. 
In the post-Cold War European case, options, variation and the agonistic pluralism of the 
political were suppressed in favour of a monist practice of enlargement rather than 
transformation. The post-communist settlement lost its emancipatory potential and reinforced 
the victory of one side at the expense of the other rather than transcending the logic of 
axiological politics in its entirety. 
The self/other binary can take both axiological and dialogical forms. A range of 
mimetic methods are present in the former, including the classic process of self-constitution 
through the µRWKHULQJ¶RIWKHRXWVLGHUDQGWKHH[WHUQDOWKUHDW7KLVSURFHVVLVDVFKDUDFWHULVWLF
of hegemonic social formations as it is for subaltern states whose identity is protean and role 
in the world contested (cf. Morozov 2015). By contrast, the dialogical version of the self and 
differentiated other allows the re-insertion of the political in the framework of a new shared 
decentred normal. The political subjectivity of the other is not only acknowledged but also 
valued, as adding an element of normative diversity to the world or in domestic politics, which 
can help to establish a healthy environment for the growth and development of the self as much 
as the other. Instead, axiological processes came increasingly to the fore in relations between 
Russia and Europe. Although the EU invested considerable resources into the relationship, with 
WDONRIµVWUDWHJLFSDUWQHUVKLS¶µFRPPRQVSDFHV¶DQGµSDUWQHUVKLSIRUPRGHUQLVDWLRQ¶much of 
this assumed that the variRXVPHFKDQLVPVRIµH[WHUQDOJRYHUQDQFH¶ZRXOGWUDQVIRUP5XVVLD
from an alien other into some version of us. The politics of adaptation assumed an axiological 
inflexion. Even at its most benign, EU policy was imbued with a transformative mission based 
on the D[LRORJLFDOEHOLHIWKDW5XVVLD¶VSROLWLFDOVXEMHFWLYLW\ZDVVRPHKRZLQDSSURSULDWHDQG
potentially pathological. 
The self/other dynamic is constantly evolving, and in this article I have argued that 
classical approaches need to be supplemented by a focus on the status of the political 
subjectivity of the other. 7KH LGHRORJ\ RI µQRUPDWLYHSRZHU¶ DQG WKHSROLWLFVRI DGDSWDWLRQ
reinforced axiological practices and their attendant power hierarchies. Didactic, if not 
orientalist or dialectical, relations were restored, re-establishing the peripherality of Eastern 
Europe and the otherness of Russia. By contrast, the dialogical approach provides a way to 
theorise how new political communities can be established on the basis not just of reciprocity 
but of recognition of political equality. This is a permanent dynamic of open-ended interactions 
and an agonistic form of the political. Dialogism may not provide any ready-made solutions, 
but it provides a key to thinking about the mutual recognition that is essential to achieving the 
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